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I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most important work of appellate courts consists of drawing,
or refusing to draw, categorical distinctions. Consider any two legal
categories. We may be able to distinguish them if they are both merely
present together in a case, or even if they interweave with one another
but retain their separate identities, the way fudge might be swirled
through vanilla ice cream while remaining distinguishable. Despite the
swirling, the fudge and the vanilla would still be recognizable. The
harder cases, though, involve the complete and inseparable blending of
two legal categories.
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
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In the free speech area, the Supreme Court has confronted these
difficulties in seeking, where possible, to disentangle commercial speech
from noncommercial speech.1 The Court has also expressed greater2 or
lesser3 reluctance to distinguish between one person’s vulgarity and
another’s lyric. 4 A distinction between “amusement” speech and

1. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–75
(1989) (finding the commercial and noncommercial elements of a student dorm
solicitation speech to not be inseparably intertwined and distinguishing the charitable
donation solicitation speech case of Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 796 (1988)); see also Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 663–65 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that the dismissal of certiorari was improvidently granted, for the
case “present[ed] novel First Amendment questions because the speech at issue
represent[ed] a blending of commercial speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an
issue of public importance”).
2. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“How is one to distinguish
this from any other offensive word? . . . [W]hile the particular four-letter word being
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless
often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”). For an example of a more
assertive judicial mood, however, see the remarkably contrasting case of FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746–48 (1978) (plurality opinion). “In this case it is
undisputed that the content of Pacifica’s broadcast was ‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and
‘shocking.’” Id.
3. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742–51 (discussing a radio broadcast of the George
Carlin “Filthy Words” monologue). For a challenge to some aspects of Pacifica, see
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 3065 (2011) (mem.).
4. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25; see also Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010) (holding that a federal statute
banning particular forms of support to foreign terrorist organizations does not violate
free speech rights). Compare Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (observing that “one man’s vulgarity
is another’s lyric,” and stating that “governmental officials cannot make principled decisions
in this area”), with Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2728 (stating that “Congress and the Executive
are uniquely positioned to make principled distinctions between activities that will
further terrorist conduct and undermine United States foreign policy, and those that will
not”).
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“doctrinal” or “propaganda” speech 5 has also been recognized as
problematic.6
The question of whether to try to judicially draw a categorical
distinction again recently arose, importantly and conspicuously, in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n.7 In Brown, Justice Scalia, for
the majority, applied a stringent free speech test of strict scrutiny.8
Brown held unconstitutional a California statute restricting the sale or
rental to minors of particular violent video games meeting specified
characteristics.9
5. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508, 510 (1948) (discussing allegedly
obscene magazines “principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of
criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime”). The
Winters Court concluded that “[t]hough we can see nothing of any possible value to
society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as
the best of literature.” Id. at 510. The problem of drawing reasonable and appropriate
categorical distinctions in free speech cases may indeed focus on the perceived value, or
lack thereof, of the speech, as in the alleged obscenity case of Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S.
497 (1987), but will more often turn on factors other than the perceived value of the
speech. See Joseph J. Anclien, Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal
Depictions, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating
Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1138 (2005). For further discussion of the Winters
language above, see, for example, the alleged obscenity case of Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 319–20 & n.21 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting), as well as the opinion by
Justice Scalia for the Court in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2733 (2011).
6. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 2738–42 (requiring “proof” of causation as well as “compelling”
evidence of a compelling governmental interest narrowly pursued without under- or
over-inclusiveness).
9. Id. at 2742. A portion of the statute limited its coverage in a way loosely
parallel to key elements of the standard Miller obscenity test, adjusted for minors and
focusing on violence rather than sex. See id. at 2732–33 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1746(d)(1)(A) (West 2009)). Among the limitations of the scope of the statute was the
element of the game’s resulting lack, “as a whole, [of] serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value for minors.” Id. The loosely analogous Miller obscenity test language
may be found in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973).
As is widely appreciated, much game playing does not involve traditional forms of
game sale or rental. Games may be played online or via nonhome console devices, and
at least the basic game might, on some business models, be given away. See generally,
e.g., Natalie Jarvey, Video Games Go Live on Internet: Will Industry Pull Plugs on
Consoles?, L.A. BUS. J., Aug. 9, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 16827202
(discussing the fast evolution from games on consoles to games on the Internet);
Matthew Lynley, Games Are the Most Popular Smartphone Apps, VENTUREBEAT (July
7, 2011, 10:40 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/07/07/nielsen-smartphone-gamespopular/ (stating that in the second quarter of 2011, smartphone owners were
downloading five to six times as many—usually short—game apps as educational or
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The analysis in Brown raises a number of secondary issues, including
whether any additional kind of speech could ever join the few speech
categories, such as fighting words, already deemed unprotected under
the Free Speech Clause.10 For our purposes, though, the crucial focus of
the opinion and this Article is on the relationship between political speech
and entertainment speech.
The crucial passage from Justice Scalia’s opinion runs as follows:
[V]ideo games qualify for First Amendment protection. The Free Speech
Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have
long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment,
and dangerous to try. “Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”11

Justice Scalia thus sees the problem as more severe than carefully
detangling, where possible, the two intertwined strands of political speech
and entertainment speech. The detangling task is instead generally not
to be attempted. At the very best, Justice Scalia seems to be saying that
distinctions between entertainment and political speech will typically be
subjective or riskily unclear and, in that sense, arbitrary and not reasonably
justified. On this basis, the violent video game statute in Brown was
then subjected to a highly demanding strict scrutiny test.12
learning apps); What Americans Do Online: Social Media and Games Dominate Activity,
NIELSEN (Aug. 6, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/what-amer
icans-do-online-social-media-and-games-dominate-activity/ (“Despite the almost
unlimited nature of what you can do on the web, 40 percent of U.S. online time is spent
on just three activities—social networking, playing games and emailing leaving a whole
lot of other sectors fighting for a declining share of the online pie.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). For a broader, if perhaps discouraging, perspective, see VICTORIA J.
RIDEOUT ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., GENERATION M2: MEDIA IN THE
LIVES OF 8- TO 18-YEAR-OLDS (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/
8010.pdf (finding that “[e]ight- to eighteen-year-olds spend . . . an average of more than
7½ hours a day, seven days a week” with various media, not even including some
popular media uses).
To the extent that the unamended statute excluded violent video game play online, on
smartphones, et cetera, that would presumably both reduce any possible positive effects
of the statute and perhaps also reduce the overall free speech burden of the statute.
10. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733–34. There is much to be said about any
historical closing of the door, forever, on any new categories of unprotected speech.
How the Court can divine at this point that no possible future combination of culture and
technology could ever generate a form of speech not meriting free speech protection, or
too riskily granted such protection, has thus far been left unclear by the Court.
11. Id. at 2733 (emphasis added) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
510 (1948)); see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir. 2006)). For an intriguing judicial
change of heart on the wisdom and viability of drawing a somewhat similar distinction
between speech that addresses matters of public or merely private concern, see infra
notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
12. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738–42.
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This Article puts in a broader legal and cultural context and critically
evaluates Justice Scalia’s reluctance to distinguish politics from entertainment
or, more precisely, political speech from entertainment speech. 13 Some
may think of Justice Scalia’s reluctance as the embodiment of
judicial modesty or realistic practical wisdom. Others may think of it as
an unnecessary expression of relativism or subjectivism that is ominous in
its implications. Either way, whether we can appropriately distinguish
between entertainment speech and political speech, and then apply
appropriately different free speech standards in each case, says much
about our status and priorities as a culture. Placing pure nonpolitical
entertainment or amusement at the very core of the Free Speech Clause
should certainly be controversial. As it turns out, if we decide that most
or all entertainment speech is indistinguishable from political speech, we
must then realistically expect other categories of speech to be treated as
practically indistinguishable from political speech as well. And all of
this may well be inconsistent with our scheme of broadly liberal
democratic values.
We initially assume below merely that Justice Scalia’s approach and
the resulting rigorous application of strict scrutiny are at least debatable
on the merits. After all, the California statute appeared to focus on a
narrow class of exceptionally violent video games, 14 vaguely akin in
some respects to constitutionally obscene materials.15 Traditional obscene
materials, we might note, must lack judicially determined serious value
when taken as a whole.16 But such obscene materials need not be shown,
through unequivocal empirical social science evidence, to distinctively
cause some serious identifiable social harm or demonstrably undermine
some compelling government interest.17 And the California statute, again,
did not attempt to deny the video games in question even to minors
where a parent was involved18 or where sale or rental could be bypassed.19
Certainly, the general moral quality of traditional forms of obscenity is
controversial. But so is the moral quality of the particular narrow class
of exceptionally violent and judicially nonvalued video games regulated

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. at 2733.
See id. at 2732.
See, e.g., id. at 2732–33 (quoting analogous language).
See, for example, the language of the obscenity cases cited infra note 51.
See the actual free speech test language of the cases cited infra note 51.
See the statutory language quoted in Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732.
See id.
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in Brown. It is possible to object to either or both of these kinds of
speech as immoral or even as unworthy of the most stringent free speech
protection even in the absence of a rigorous demonstration of serious
social harm.
In fact, one can quote Justice Scalia himself from a prior case to suggest
the ability to debate his approach in Brown. Consider the approach taken
by Justice Scalia in the context of public nude dancing as erotically
expressive speech:
The traditional power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and
the acceptability of the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes to endorse it) that
nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by the First
Amendment.20

This is not to suggest inconsistency on the part of Justice Scalia.
Perhaps one could say that nude dancing before consenting adults in a
club setting is contrary to enforceable public morals but that the
transactions with minors regulated in Brown are not.
Our initial aim is, again, not to immediately endorse or take issue with
Justice Scalia’s approach in Brown. We instead initially assume merely
that his approach was either generally well-chosen or not. That much
seems uncontroversial enough. The question we first consider focuses
instead on how a society could gain enough perspective on itself—
enough critical self-awareness—to evaluate the overall merits of Justice
Scalia’s approach. On the basis of a broader cultural perspective, the
substantial risks and costs of Justice Scalia’s approach eventually
become clearer.
The discussion below assumes that a legal culture and its surrounding
broader culture do not always make their constitutional mistakes entirely
at random. Consider, by loose analogy, that a cowardly or rash individual
person tends, more than others, to act cowardly or rashly.21 A rash
person’s mistakes are in that sense not random. Without pressing the
20. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
For a loosely related sentiment concerning the enforcement, in a non-First Amendment
Commerce Clause context, of a sense of public morality apart from any identifiable
harmful consequences, see the opinion of Judge Richard Posner for the court in Cavel
International v. Madigan:
But even if no horses live longer as a result of the new law, a state is
permitted, within reason, to express disgust at what people do with the dead,
whether dead human beings or dead animals. . . . A follower of John Stuart
Mill would disapprove of a law that restricted the activities of other people . . .
on the basis merely of distaste, but American governments are not constrained
by Mill’s doctrine.
500 F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 2007).
21. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, reprinted in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD: ARISTOTLE: II 334, bks. II & IV, at 348, 387 (Robert Maynard
Hutchins ed., W.D. Ross trans., 1952) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
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analogy between individuals and cultures,22 we can easily imagine that
cultures with particular characteristic defects or excesses tend over time
to exhibit those defects or excesses disproportionately, even in judicial
decisionmaking.
The point, stated in the broadest fashion, is this: to the extent that we
are aware of our culture’s systematic defects and excesses, that critical
self-awareness may promote better constitutional decisions or at least
allow us to recognize the especially likely nature of our systematic or
characteristic constitutional mistakes.
As it turns out, the categories most widely discussed by historians,
philosophers, and cultural critics that most assist us in this regard are
three in number. As the first very general category, used herein merely
as a baseline, a legal and surrounding culture might be referred to simply
as “civilized.”23 Second, a culture that seems in some important particular
respect to be in overall decline can, to that extent, be thought of as “late”
or “decadent.”24 Third, and finally, a culture might, in some respects,
depart from both pure civilization and “lateness” in ways that can
reasonably be thought of as crudely uncivilized or even “barbaric.”25
Once these categories are fleshed out to anyone’s satisfaction, that
person may then decide on the extent to which the above categories, or
some mixture thereof, describe our own contemporary legal or broader
culture. On that basis, we may gain some important additional perspective
on the correspondingly likely nature of our culture’s systematic
constitutional mistakes.
Our basic assumption in this regard was articulated by the great
novelist Thomas Mann in this way: “A human being lives out not only
his personal life as an individual, but also, consciously or subconsciously,

22. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC pt. II, bks. II–IV, at 41–139 (Francis MacDonald
Cornford trans., 1941) (c. 360 B.C.E.).
23. We are here using the idea of civilization as an ideal type, not as a description
of any real culture. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF
INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY 654–57 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim
Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968). Even an ideal legal civilization in
this sense, untainted by any elements of lateness, decline, or decadence, or by any trace
of barbarism, could still make constitutional mistakes, perhaps even systematically, but
not of a distinctly late or a barbaric pattern.
24. For a broad range of perspectives, see, for example, the sources cited infra
notes 107–20, 131.
25. For illustrative references, see, for example, the sources cited infra notes 125–
30.
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the lives of his epoch and contemporaries . . . .”26 Presumably, this applies
even to judges.
The hope, in particular, is that each reader’s judgments in this regard
will further inform that reader’s response to Justice Scalia’s approach in
Brown, in which it is deemed generally too difficult and too dangerous
to attempt to distinguish political speech from entertainment speech,
with even the latter thus receiving equally rigorous strict scrutiny
protection.27 The costs of this approach in general are explored in the
conclusion.
Below, the Article first briefly reviews some of the related entertainment
speech case law.28 Once this judicial background is in place, the idea of
a culture that is thought to be “late stage,” in decline, or decadent is then
taken up as usefully as possible. 29 An account of the idea of the
uncivilized or barbaric, as set off against the idea of civilization, is then
briefly referred to, drawing upon the work of historians, philosophers,
and cultural critics.30 The conclusion recognizes that even clear cultural
tendencies, trends, biases, or patterns cannot reliably explain individual
cases such as Brown.31 The conclusion instead seeks to bring all of the
above strands together and provide a broad vantage point and perspective
for critiquing the merits of Justice Scalia’s crucial logic in Brown.32 The
conclusion offers implications, however, that extend far beyond the
context of merely the Brown decision itself.
II. THE FREE SPEECH LAW CONTEXT OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S
APPROACH IN BROWN
Justice Scalia’s reluctance to seek to judicially distinguish entertainment
speech from political speech, even in the case of the narrow class of
video games regulated in Brown, is not without support in various
related areas of free speech law. It seems well-established, at a more
general level, that under the Free Speech Clause, “[e]ntertainment . . . is
protected; . . . live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works,
fall[s] within the First Amendment guarantee.”33 Music in general,
26. THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN 31 (John E. Woods trans., 1995)
(1925).
27. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–42 (2011).
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733; infra Part IV.
33. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981), quoted in Club
Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 211 (5th Cir. 2009). See the explicitly political
message entertainment case Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989),
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whether live34 or purely instrumental and thus with no lyrical or other
verbal content,35 is constitutionally protected.36 Performance art falls
within the Free Speech Clause.37 Tattooing, whether as tattooer or tattooee,
is similarly protected.38
Especially prominent among the related free speech cases are the
commercial nude dancing and adult entertainment cases. As Judge Guido
Calabresi has observed, “Over the past few decades, adult entertainment
establishments have played a disproportionately prominent role in First
Amendment doctrine.”39 Precisely how to constitutionally categorize

involving a concert in Central Park. For broad dictum, see Kaplan v. California, 413
U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973), which states that “pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and
engravings . . . have First Amendment protection.”
34. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 790; Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 539 (5th Cir.
2004); McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2003).
35. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2009).
36. See DA Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1265–66 (11th
Cir. 2007).
37. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–89 (1998)
(involving refusals of federal subsidies for the undoubtedly political message-bearing
performance art of Karen Finley); Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1036 & n.4
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (involving a street or park performer permit and donation
solicitations).
38. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2010).
39. TJS of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2010). The
sheer number and conspicuousness of adult entertainment free speech cases at the
appellate level might be taken by some as one very modest indicator of civilization
edging into lateness or decline. We shall not explore that possibility herein, given the
possible alternative explanations.
For the merest sampling of the commercial nude dancing cases, as distinct from the
adult bookstore, video, movie, and magazine cases, see, for example, Sensations, Inc. v.
City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2008); Fantasy Ranch Inc. v. City of
Arlington, 459 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2006); G.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph,
350 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2003); Lleh, Inc. v. Wichita County, 289 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2002);
Ways v. City of Lincoln, 274 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 2001); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.
2001); and Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001).
Separable as well are the adult entertainment free speech cases focusing on liquor
licenses and alcohol sale or consumption. See, e.g., Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637
F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2011); Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans, 612 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2010);
Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 596 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2010); East Brook
Books, Inc. v. Shelby Cnty., 588 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2009); Richland Bookmart, Inc. v.
Knox Cnty., 555 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2009); Joelner v. Vill. of Wash. Park, 508 F.3d 427
(7th Cir. 2007); Illusions—Dallas Private Club, Inc. v. Steen, 482 F.3d 299 (5th Cir.
2007); 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2006); Odle v. Decatur Cnty.,
421 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2005); Ben’s Bar v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir.
2003).
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commercial nude dancing40 and adult entertainment zoning regulations41
has posed a number of apparently difficult challenges for the Supreme
Court.42
Speech in the form of the expressive or symbolic conduct involved in
commercial nude dancing is apparently protected by the First Amendment
in rather standard ways. Regulation of such speech on the basis of its
content or assumed viewpoint would apparently evoke the rigorous
standard of strict scrutiny,43 requiring, at least, the clear advancement of
a compelling governmental interest by narrowly tailored means.44
Regulating such speech on something like a content-neutral basis, however,
evokes only some form of mid-level scrutiny.45
The Supreme Court has explicitly declared that the standard sorts of
commercial expressive nude dancing do not lie at the heart of the First
Amendment as central free speech cases. Thus, the plurality opinion in
the Barnes case determined that “nude dancing of the kind sought to be
performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the
First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”46 Similarly,
the opinion for the Court in Pap’s A.M. refers to such expressive conduct
as falling “only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s
protection.”47
Nevertheless, a content-based regulation of such speech would
presumably still draw strict scrutiny.48 When the Court refers to
expressive nude dancing as just barely within the outer bounds of the First
Amendment, the implication is thus not that such speech is generally

40. See, for example, the Court’s divisions in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S.
277 (2000), and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
41. See, for example, the Court’s fracturing and recourse to dubiously explained
legal fictions in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002), and
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See also the less
controversial, timely judicial review case of City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.,
541 U.S. 774 (2004).
42. See authorities cited supra notes 40–41.
43. See, e.g., Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (citing the strict scrutiny flag burning
case of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)).
44. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403, 406–07.
45. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (citing the draft-card burning case of United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). See also the somewhat similar contentneutral regulation tests adopted in Renton, 475 U.S. at 47, and Alameda Books, 535 U.S.
at 440, and at the court of appeals level in Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v.
Manatee County, 630 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 2011); 729, Inc. v. Kenton County
Fiscal Court, 515 F.3d 485, 503 (6th Cir. 2008); and 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d
228, 233 (3d Cir. 2006).
46. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (emphasis added).
47. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289.
48. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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subject to some lesser standard of constitutional protection.49 Such speech
is not to be thought of as generally second-class speech on the constitutional
scale. Rather, the idea is apparently that expressive commercial nude
dancing somehow barely makes it over the boundary line into generally
fully protected status.
Finally, a sampling of the relatively few violent video game free speech
cases prior to Brown rounds out the constitutional context of Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Brown. The speech regulations in these cases vary,
but the typical legislative focus has been on somehow limiting juvenile
access to the most graphically violent video games, where the game in
question was deemed to lack serious literary, artistic, scientific, or,
importantly, political value for minors.50 The typical such regulation,
then, did not seek to regulate any video game judicially determined to
have serious political value for minors.51 This constitutionally based
judicial determination clearly bears on Justice Scalia’s doubts as to the
reasonable distinguishability of entertainment speech from political speech.
It is also worth noting the literalist but telling point that a number,
though certainly not all, of the violent video game cases involve regulated
corporate parties whose very names, voluntarily chosen, include terms
such as entertainment or amusement.52 This of course does not establish
that violent video games in general aim at entertainment or amusement
to the exclusion of politics or that entertainment speech can always be
separated from political speech. But it suggests something of the typical,
basic self-understanding, intentions, and priorities of the regulated corporate
parties.
49. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. But compare Judge Calabresi’s
declaration, in the zoning context, that “the Court has upheld adult entertainment zoning
restrictions that would almost certainly be unconstitutional if applied to pure political
speech.” TJS of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2010). This
may depend on how far courts are willing to go in finding a regulation of speech to be
sufficiently content neutral in adult entertainment and political speech cases respectively.
Compare the zoning cases cited supra notes 39–45 with the case of apparently political
speech violating a broad, if vague, street noise ordinance in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949).
50. Our attention below, in chronological order, will be on Entertainment Software
Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St.
Louis County (IDS), 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); and American Amusement Machine
Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
51. For this terminology in the obscenity law context, see, for example, Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 58 n.6 (1989); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,
500–01 (1987); and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
52. See cases cited supra note 50.
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The first of the major pre-Brown violent video game case opinions to
consider is American Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick,53 authored
by Judge Richard Posner. As it happens, the regulation in Kendrick
appeared to be limited to a particular class of “amusement machines.”54
If it had been the case that the regulated parties intended to convey, or
could reasonably be interpreted to have conveyed, any sort of political
message, it is not clear that those machines would even be considered
mere amusement machines within the literal scope of the regulation.
It might even have been arguable that a machine intended both to
convey a political message, however vaguely,55 and to amuse the player
should not be legally reduced to the category of amusement machines.56
The regulated parties in Kendrick, however, could have understandably
thought of themselves as engaged in amusement or entertainment
speech, as separate and distinct, in their case, from political speech. The
basic distinction between entertainment speech and political speech seems,
in Kendrick’s context, to be reasonably manageable. In any event, the
ordinance at issue in Kendrick regulated access by minors to public
video game machines and was further limited to not just amusement
machines but rather those machines appealing to a minor’s “morbid
interest in violence” and featuring “graphic violence” as further specified by
the ordinance.57
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the ordinance by its terms
excluded from its coverage any video game found to be of “serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value as a whole” for minors.58
This language by itself can hardly prove the reasonable distinguishability, in
typical cases, of entertainment or amusement speech and political speech.
But the obvious inference from the regulatory language and the typical
obscenity case opinions is that some entertainment speech will also
involve significant political content, some entertainment speech will not,
53. 244 F.3d 572.
54. Id. at 573.
55. Under the current judicial understanding, protected speech need not involve,
even from the speaker’s perspective, any particularized message or idea. See Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi-Sexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). For the more
restrictive understanding prior to Hurley, see the opinions in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989).
56. By analogy, would we think of the relevant works of Dickens, Hardy,
Dostoevsky, Hugo, and Zola as fairly and entirely reducible to the category of
amusement? Realistically, some such video game sellers might not have consciously
conceived of themselves as speakers seeking on a daily basis to convey even a vague or
general message as opposed to merely filling a profitable market niche. But for
constitutional purposes, they are, in any event, deemed speakers. See IDS, 329 F.3d 954,
956–57 (8th Cir. 2003).
57. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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and the courts will commonly be able to reasonably draw this distinction
as a matter of law. This is certainly not to deny that there will unavoidably
be borderline cases59 or that entertainment speech and political speech
may indeed delicately interlace. But even in such cases, the entertainment
and the politics may still be separable, or at least distinguishable, in
principle.
The crucial question, following Justice Scalia, is ultimately whether
any influence, including culturally late subjectivism, relativism, prudence,
judicial humility, a sense of fallibility, or even nihilism, should lead us to
largely abandon all attempts to distinguish entertainment from politics, in
this context and far more generally, and then to abandon as well other
familiar distinctions between political speech and other forms of speech.
The practical implications of our realistically abandoning such distinctions
among speech categories would, as we shall conclude, be substantial and
generally unappealing.
Moreover, Judge Posner in Kendrick does draw a distinction between
the possible harms of speech and the possible offensiveness of speech.60
The video game ordinance was thought to be based largely on purported
harms,61 whereas traditionally, obscenity has been prohibited based largely
on its adjudicated offensiveness62 to community norms.63 In Kendrick,
Judge Posner found, at least at the preliminary injunction stage, no
“compelling” evidentiary grounds sufficient to justify the regulation.64
59. We can imagine, unfortunately, torture video games to be judged by some as
essentially “entertainment” speech, by others as essentially “political” speech, of
whatever quality, and by still others as perhaps “hate speech.” And it would admittedly
be possible to argue both that all forms of torture are always wrong and that only
minimal harm results from the repeated play, by minors, of realistic interactive torture
video games. This might depend on the minor’s familiarity, desensitization, habit, social
and other environmental influences, age, duration, general mental health, and idea
compartmentalization.
60. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574–75.
61. See id. at 575.
62. See id. at 574; see also cases cited supra note 51.
63. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574. We might well wonder whether regulations of
allegedly obscene materials in general on the basis of the content of the speech in
question should, following the court’s logic, be subject to strict scrutiny. Put somewhat
differently, does the Miller obscenity test, including its focus on community offense,
invariably reflect the meaningful advancement of a genuinely compelling governmental
interest? See id. at 574–76; cases cited supra note 51.
64. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 580. Compelling in this context refers not to the
importance of the state interest sought to be promoted by the regulation but to the
convincingness of the largely social scientific or other empirical evidence linking the
targeted speech to any cited harms. See id. at 576–80. Thus, strict scrutiny is not simply
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As to the quality of the violent video games themselves, Judge Posner
was disinclined to equate The House of the Dead with classic literary
texts.65 More broadly, Judge Posner recognized that with respect to the
video games in question, “[w]e are in the world of kids’ popular culture.”66
This observation, however, amounts to merely judicial literary criticism
rather than an attribution of insufficient political or other constitutional
value.67
One complication, though, is that Judge Posner characterized the
particular game Ultimate Mortal Kombat 3 as “surprisingly, a feminist
violent video game.”68 Judge Posner reported that the game is in this sense
political and that it “has a message, even an ‘ideology,’ just as books and
movies do.”69
We can address this element of the entertainment speech and political
speech relationship through considering further the case Interactive
Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County (IDS), regarding sale or rental
of violent video games to minors.70 IDS approvingly quotes Kendrick on
this ideological message point,71 concluding that “these ‘violent’72 video
games contain stories, imagery, ‘age-old themes of literature,’” as well
as messages or “even an ideology.”73

a matter of a typically boilerplate compelling governmental interest and a typically
manipulable inquiry into the issue of narrow tailoring; strict scrutiny may also involve
onerous, and even practically unmeetable, evidentiary causation burdens on the state.
See infra note 99; see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–42
(2011).
65. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 578 (“‘The House of the Dead’ is not distinguished
literature.”).
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
68. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 578.
69. Id. Whether a given minor could become a feminist, or learn about feminism,
through other means, or even by playing this particular violent video game in some
unregulated format, we leave to speculation.
70. 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
71. Id. at 957.
72. It is not clear why the term violent in this context was put into quotation marks
of an apparently distancing, rather than a word-referencing or a source-indicating, sort.
The usual function of distancing quotation marks is to indicate a certain skepticism,
subjectivism, or relativism concerning the term in question. Although the court is
certainly welcome to adopt such perspectives in general, and although no video game is
literally violent, one might question whether the credibility of the court’s analysis is
really enhanced by a court’s suggesting that referring to even the most violent video
games as violent at all is somehow problematic or arbitrary. If the most violent video
game activities were carried out in real life, would the court still ironize or resist the use
of term violent?
73. IDS, 329 F.3d at 957 (quoting Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577–78). IDS notes that
because the Supreme Court has accepted the paintings of Jackson Pollock, music of
Arnold Schoenberg, and Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll as protected speech, the
video games at issue should qualify as protectable speech as well. Id. For this point, the
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We should, at this point, emphasize that the focus of Justice Scalia’s
(non)distinction is between political speech in particular and entertainment
or amusement speech. Neither Justice Scalia nor this Article addresses
the constitutional value of, say, scientific speech74 or the judicial ability
to distinguish scientific speech from either political speech or entertainment
speech, assuming that the latter categories can themselves be distinguished.
We can thus set aside a number of further complications.
It is in the end certainly possible, for some purposes and on some
definitions, to say that every video game, violent or otherwise, involves
an ideology,75 or even a political ideology, however hazy or unintended
and nonparticularized.76 For some purposes, perhaps everything we say
has political implications, whether intended, likely grasped, or not.77
But if every video game, violent or otherwise, is held for free speech
purposes to embody a political message and involve political speech, we
have then for most important purposes gone too far, and we will inevitably
pay too high a price in terms of our basic constitutional and cultural
values. If every regulated video game counts, along with the LincolnDouglas debates,78 as political speech, then realistically every instance of
commercial speech79 would have as good a claim to embody an ideology,
IDS court relies primarily on Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group,
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
74. Commonsensically, there will be overlaps of one sort or another between
scientific and political speech, as in the H-bomb “recipe” or proliferation case of United
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), as well as in cases of
scientific speech in which political themes are absent or at least separable, and in cases
of political speech that are not also scientific speech in the standard senses of the terms.
If anything, this suggests a more manageable distinguishability of political speech and
entertainment speech than Justice Scalia seems comfortable with.
75. See IDS, 329 F.3d at 957 (quoting Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577–78).
76. For the ability to protect nonparticularized ideas, see Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
77. See generally R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First
Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010)
(discussing the scope of what counts as speech for First Amendment purposes).
78. See Abraham Lincoln-Stephen Douglas Debates (1858), in THE LINCOLNDOUGLAS DEBATES (Rodney O. Davis & Douglas L. Wilson eds., 2008).
79. The Supreme Court’s crucial “early” commercial speech cases are Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761–62 (1976), and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980). Perhaps the most explicit treatment of
“intertwined” commercial and noncommercial speech is Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989). For one indication,
though, of a gradual, halting, inconsistent drift toward treating commercial speech as in
some respects more akin to political speech, see Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, 535 U.S. 357, 366–67 (2002).
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even a political ideology.80 At least to the extent that amusing video
games carry an ideology, commercial speech carries an implicit ideology
of commodity, market-based, or commercial solutions.81 This would render
much of the Supreme Court’s largely separate and distinct commercial
speech jurisprudence completely incoherent.82
Or we could ask in addition, if all video game speech is relevantly
political, why most, if not all, workplace or school-based verbal sexual
harassment speech is not at least equally politically ideological. Why
would not strict scrutiny of all content-based regulations of such harassing
speech be called for?83 And again, why would not nearly all pornography
and obscenity count as political-ideological speech and thus be protected
by strict scrutiny when regulated on the basis of its content or viewpoint?84
Additional categories, including some forms of criminal or tortious speech,
can also be equally political and thus raise further problems under
Justice Scalia’s analysis.
We could thus, in a burst of enthusiasm, think of nearly all speech as
First Amendment political speech. But even if we do so, our basic
collective and individual values and priorities would not thereby be
changed. Many of us, for example, can imagine making great sacrifices
for basic political or religious beliefs, perhaps to protect freedom of
scientific inquiry or the collective library of civilization itself. The prospect,
on the other hand, of fighting and dying on a foreign shore so as to
protect minors’ access to especially violent and not otherwise seriously
80. Commercial speech, taken collectively or not, in a sense inherently promotes
market-transactional solutions—the exchange of money for goods and services—rather
than alternative approaches to even life’s deepest problems. See R. GEORGE WRIGHT,
SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL CULTURE 12–77 (1997).
81. See id.
82. As one example, the Court allows for prohibition of commercial speech that is
false, deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes an illegal transaction. See Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64. In contrast, any attempt to prohibit political speech
deemed to be, say, deceptive or misleading—the various future costs of a proposed
spending program perhaps—would typically be a nonstarter, given the potential for bias
and abuse. For a somewhat closer case, see, for example, 281 Care Committee v.
Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2011), protecting even knowingly false electoral
campaign speech through a strict scrutiny test. See also the Court’s willingness to
distinguish, in several contexts, between speech that is and is not on a matter of public
interest and concern, as referred to infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
83. For references to such issues, see National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Baty v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th
Cir. 1999); and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
See also Doe v. City of New York, 583 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(discussing limited First Amendment protections of harassing e-mails sent in the
workplace).
84. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. For an argument for a stronger
linkage between much pornographic or obscene material and ideological politics, see
generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1996).

356

[VOL. 49: 341, 2012]

Judicial Line-Drawing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

valuable video games from some reasonable regulation may well not
seem so inspiring.
More generally, few of us would be willing to thus fight and die to
protect ourselves from typical regulations of what in reality amounts to a
minute and readily replaceable fraction of our entertainment or amusement
alternatives.85 Less dramatically, few of us would be willing to trade away
some important egalitarian or other civilizational values, as a rigorous
strict scrutiny might require,86 in order to protect the above video game
access rights, particularly given all the increasingly broad and accessible
remaining entertainment and amusement options.87 Distinguishing, insofar
as possible, political speech from entertainment speech is thus of broad and
serious importance.
We have seen in particular that most of the violent video game and
related regulations exempt even the most violent such material if, taken
as a whole, the material is of serious literary, artistic, scientific, or
political value for juveniles.88 It is in this light that we must consider the
IDS court’s apparently admirable humility in declaring, finally, that
“[w]hether we believe the advent of violent video games adds anything
of value to society is irrelevant.”89 On first glance, this attitude may
remind us of the healthy sense of fallibility endorsed by free speech
champions such as John Stuart Mill90 and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.91
But we should, in contrast, bear in mind not only the typical regulatory
exclusion for products with any relevant serious value92 but also the very
real social costs of protecting what might be admittedly trivial or
vacuous messages by a rigorous strict scrutiny test.93

85. For the increasing range of such options, see the sources cited supra note 9.
86. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–42 (2011); supra
note 64; infra note 99.
87. See supra note 9. It may not be much of an overstatement to say that virtually
any standard form of entertainment or amusement is now available on virtually every
platform or every kind of communications device.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51, 58.
89. IDS, 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003).
90. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 77–84 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
Pelican Books 1974) (1859) (“All silencing of discussion is an assumption of
infallibility.”).
91. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]ime has upset many fighting faiths. . . . [T]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51, 58.
93. See, e.g., IDS, 329 F.3d at 958–59.
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The third and last of our pre-Brown violent video game cases,
Entertainment94 Software Ass’n v. Swanson, again involved restrictions
on the sale or rental to minors of a particular class of violent video
games.95 This case is notable for the combination of its obvious uneasiness
regarding the real constitutional value of the video games in question
and remarkable stringency in applying strict scrutiny even to such video
games.96 Thus, in Swanson, the Eighth Circuit concludes that “[a]lthough
some might say that it is risible to compare the violence depicted in the
examples [of video games] offered by the State to that described in
classical literature, such violence has been deemed by our court worthy
of First Amendment protection, and there the matter stands.”97
It is difficult to believe that the court would feel any need for this
apparent defensiveness and distancing if it also sensed much of a
political speech element in the video games in question. But on the basis
of precedent, at least, the Swanson court, again with apparent misgivings,
applied a stringent strict scrutiny test with a special emphasis on
unequivocal proof of causation. Thus, the court concluded that
having failed to come forth with incontrovertible proof of a causal relationship
between the exposure to such violence and subsequent psychological dysfunction,
the State has not satisfied its evidentiary burden. The requirement of such a
high level of proof may reflect a refined estrangement from reality,98 but apply
it we must.99

94. Note again the apparent self-understanding of the regulated parties as marketing
entertainment without explicit reference to anything like political advocacy. See supra
text accompanying note 52.
95. 519 F.3d 768, 769–70 (8th Cir. 2008). This case is from the same circuit as
and builds upon the IDS case discussed above. See supra notes 70–73 and
accompanying text.
96. See Swanson, 519 F.3d at 772.
97. Id. Almost without exception, and for perhaps a variety of reasons, virtually
every judicial opinion striking down a restriction on minors’ access to violent video
games explicitly notes that there are passages depicting violence in classic literary
works, including Homer, the Bible, Dante, and Shakespeare. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736–37 (2011); Swanson, 519 F.3d at 772.
98. We need not take a position on whether “a refined estrangement from reality”
would also be characteristic of the concept of lateness or decadence.
99. Swanson, 519 F.3d at 772; see also IDS, 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003)
(applying strict scrutiny to ordinance regulating graphically violent video games based
on their conduct); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th
Cir. 2001) (requiring government to prove a compelling interest to uphold ordinance
limiting minors’ access to violent video games). If this causal proof standard is taken
literally, it might well be realistically incapable of being met in this context or in most
other social science contexts of any complexity. For discussion of the particular problem
of “causal density,” see Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know,
CITY J., Summer 2010, at 14, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_3_socialscience.html. See also the various methodological and other systematic problems raised
in John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED.
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The above cases, taken together, generally indicate the most directly
relevant judicial thinking available to Justice Scalia in Brown. On the
basis of this relatively narrow legal context of Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Brown, we may now broaden our focus and present some possible
perspectives on the wider cultural context of that opinion.
III. THE BROADER CULTURAL CONTEXT OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S
APPROACH IN BROWN
Despite Justice Scalia’s concerns,100 the courts often assume that
despite the various complications of mixture, overlap, intertwining, and
borderline cases, it will generally be possible to reasonably distinguish
political or ideological speech from speech101 that qualifies as entertainment
or amusement. The cases generally draw a reasonable and meaningful
distinction between political speech and entertainment speech.102 Of course,
some instances of speech, such as George Carlin’s famously litigated
monologue, may count as both.103 But there is certainly a case to be
made for a more confident judicial approach to the distinction than Justice
Scalia adopts in Brown.
If we seek a broad and deep explanation for Justice Scalia’s approach
—his reluctance to judicially distinguish between political speech and
696 (2005), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/fetchArticle?articleURI=info%3
Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0020124.
100. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion of the underlying question of what should count as speech, see
generally Wright, supra note 77.
102. For a sampling of cases distinguishing political and entertainment speech, at
least as abstract categories, see, for example, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 65 (1981), which stated that “[e]ntertainment, as well as political and
ideological speech, is protected”; Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir.
2007); Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 2005); Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1284 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004); Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason,
303 F.3d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 2002); and James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 695
(6th Cir. 2002). Even a court that holds, however unwisely, that entertainment speech
should receive the same level of free speech protection as political speech thereby
impliedly concedes the categorical distinction, in principle, between the two kinds of
speech.
103. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Of course, the instances of
some sort of intertwining of political and entertainment speech are many. For a personal
favorite, involving only limited violence by some contemporary standards, see THE
ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD (Warner Bros. Pictures 1938), which contains nongraphic
deaths by bow and arrow, hangings, officially imposed violence against civilians,
quarter staff battle, table throwing, and swordfights to the death, including a climactic
duel between Robin and Sir Guy.
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entertainment speech—we naturally consider how broader cultural trends
and the “spirit of the age”104 might have influenced the decision. First,
though, we must consider some qualifications.
We have already noticed the daunting complexity of most inquiries
into social causation.105 And even if it were possible to fully explain
Justice Scalia’s approach in causal terms, that would neither confirm nor
invalidate his approach on the merits.106 Further, any attempt to apply
broader cultural themes to a judicial decision must inevitably oversimplify
the cultural background. Cultural explanations are more reliable in
explaining overall patterns of judicial decisions than any single judicial
decision in isolation. And as well, no cultural trend is without its own
qualifications, limits, and countertrends.
This is all true more specifically of the cultural categories of lateness,
decline, and decadence as well as the often conflicting category of
barbarism against the background category of civilization. Lateness or
decline, for example, will sometimes be accompanied by, linked with, or
even intertwined with genuinely progressive and liberating cultural change.
Lateness or decadence is to some degree ambiguous and unclear in
itself.107 The idea of lateness may ultimately have no essence—no set of
necessary and sufficient conditions. And for every cultural phenomenon
we might associate with lateness or decadence, we can find within that
culture an apparently contrary trend of one degree or another.
Yet in the end, with all these qualifications, we sometimes find it
possible to say, for example, that a sports team, perhaps, or a prominent
multigenerational family has entered into a late period of decline. Granting

104. See, e.g., Henry W. Ehrmann, The Zeitgeist and the Supreme Court, 11
ANTIOCH REV. 424, 424 (1951) (“[T]he justices of the Supreme Court must have felt in
their chambers the breath of the [‘spirit of the age’] upon them.”).
105. See supra note 99.
106. This could involve what is known as the “genetic fallacy,” in which a
psychological explanation of why a person has come to a particular belief is supposed to
refute the claim that the belief is true. See, e.g., Genetic Fallacies, LOGICAL FALLACIES,
http://www.logicalfallacies.info/relevance/genetic (last visited May 10, 2012).
107. For a strong version of this view, see RICHARD GILMAN, DECADENCE: THE
STRANGE LIFE OF AN EPITHET 15, 180 (1979), which denies that the term decadence has
any clear, fixed, objective, or descriptive reference over time though does not contest its
standard associations and connotations as with late—the moribund, exhaustion, inability
to make course corrections, or loss of vigor. But cf. JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO
DECADENCE, at xvi (2000) (“All that is meant by Decadence is ‘falling off.’”); Neville
Morley, Decadence as a Theory of History, 35 NEW LITERARY HIST. 573, 573 (2004)
(‘“Decadence’ when applied to the present tells us that we are late . . . .”).
Realistically, there may be little or nothing that objectively suggests lateness or decline
in a society; if someone views a society as late, that is often due not to the gradual
accumulation of evidence but to a more or less sudden, perhaps subconscious, shift in
perspective in which the person now sees much of a wide range of the culture’s features
as suggesting lateness or decline.
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the impossibility of uncontroversially pinning down all the particular
elements of lateness, we can still survey some of the possible indications
thereof. No such listing can be incontestable or complete. No attempt
will be made here to defend one list of indicators of lateness over
another. Readers are encouraged to add, delete, or reformulate at will
and then apply their own formulation. Nor can we here assess the
relative importance of any possible indicator of lateness with respect to
any other. Instead, the important point is that to the extent that we recognize
our broader culture as late—or even in some respects as perhaps bearing
marks of barbarism for that matter—the judicial decisionmaking in that
culture, at the level of high-profile, open-ended, and controversial judicial
decisions, becomes more fully explainable.108
What then might be some of the phenomena often associated with
cultural lateness, particularly those phenomena that might bear, directly
or indirectly, consciously or subconsciously, on the approach taken by
Justice Scalia in a case like Brown? In no particular order, and again
without priority or endorsement, one could list a number of possible lateness
indicators: a vague sense that the culture itself has become rather like a
tightrope walker with a recently developed excessive self-awareness or a
“loss of nerve,” resulting in ill-assured steps, lurches, decisional blockage,
rigidity, or institutional paralysis followed by indicators such as a loss of
genuine collective self-confidence and vitality, despite artificially high levels
of cultural narcissism and self-esteem;109 a fundamentally unserious politics
of partisanship, posturing, conscious demagoguery, polarization,110 animosity,
fragmentation, and vehemence at nearly any cost but often based on thin, if

108. See supra notes 26, 104 and accompanying text.
109. Or to change the metaphor, to reflect excessively on one’s bicycle-riding
technique is likely to impair, rather than enhance, one’s bicycle riding. As for the
narcissism theme, see, for example, JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE
NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT 260 (2009). Twenge and
Campbell say, “[I]ndividual Americans and our shared culture are becoming more narcissistic
over time.” Id. They then say, “[N]arcissism causes . . . aggression, materialism, lack of
caring for others, and shallow values,” which indicates “vanity . . . entitlement and
selfishness” and “a substitution of fantasy for reality.” Id. at 9, 276, 277. For the
narcissistic disdain for history, see CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM
31–32 (1979). There may, of course, be some overlap between traits such as vanity,
entitlement-mindedness, or selfishness and other psychopathologies.
110. See the sources cited in R. George Wright, Self-Censorship and the
Constriction of Thought and Discussion Under Modern Communications Technologies,
25 NOTRE DAME. J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 123 (2011).
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not ultimately arbitrary, forms of subjectivism, relativism,111 skepticism,
and other similarly modest foundations;112 a cultural coarsening and
disinhibition of antisocial impulses unrelated to any genuinely progressive
aim; an increasing willingness to heavily discount the future despite
interest in environmentalism; a redistribution from the future to the
present; an increasing sense of a cultural incapacity for sufficient selfcorrection; an increasingly thin understanding of even knowledge-based
authority and legitimacy; a widespread indifference to some forms of
violence; a culture of the consumption of entertaining experiences, goods,
and services of whatever sort; conspicuous self-indulgence as opposed to
prudence or reasonable self-restraint;113 a diminishing interest more broadly
in the classic secular virtues historically prized by many cultures;114 an
111. For some of the most sophisticated contemporary discussions of cultural and
metaethical relativism from both adherents and critics, see generally PAUL A.
BOGHOSSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE: AGAINST RELATIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM (2006);
ERNEST GELLNER, RELATIVISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1985); GILBERT HARMAN &
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY (1996); LARRY
LAUDAN, BEYOND POSITIVISM AND RELATIVISM: THEORY, METHOD, AND EVIDENCE
(1996); STEVEN LUKES, MORAL RELATIVISM (2008); JOSEPH MARGOLIS, THE TRUTH
ABOUT RELATIVISM (1991); MORAL RELATIVISM: A READER (Paul K. Moser & Thomas
L. Carson eds., 2001); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, RECLAIMING TRUTH: CONTRIBUTION TO A
CRITIQUE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM (1996); RELATIVISM: A CONTEMPORARY ANTHOLOGY
(Michael Krausz ed., 2010); RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL (Jack W. Meiland &
Michael Krausz eds., 1982); DAVID B. WONG, NATURAL MORALITIES: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISTIC RELATIVISM (2006).
112. The twentieth-century philosopher C.E.M. Joad linked his own conception of
decadence to “(1) [s]cepticism in belief; (2) Epicureanism and Hedonism in conduct;
[and] (3) [s]ubjectivism in thought, art, and morals.” C.E.M. JOAD, DECADENCE:
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 100 (1948). For a brief critique of Joad, see P.F. Strawson,
Book Review, 24 J. ROYAL INST. PHIL. 266–67 (1949) (reviewing JOAD, supra).
It should be noticed that there is really no logical linkage between relativism or
subjectivism, et cetera, and the virtue of tolerance or respect for pluralism and diversity.
See, e.g., RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO GOOD AND EVIL? 30–33
(2004). Relativism, et cetera, does not, in this regard, offer any distinctive moral or
constitutional payoff not otherwise obtainable. This is even more clearly true in the case
of fashionable versions of nihilism. For a brief discussion, see HUBERT DREYFUS &
SEAN DORRANCE KELLY, ALL THINGS SHINING: READING THE WESTERN CLASSICS TO
FIND MEANING IN A SECULAR AGE 71 (2011) (“The nihilism of our secular age leaves us
with the awful sense that nothing matters in the world at all. If nothing matters then
there is no basis for doing any one thing over any other . . . .”).
113. See JOAD, supra note 112, at 95, 100, 125; James K. Glassman, Notes on
Europe’s Economic Decadence, COMMENTARY, July/Aug. 2010, at 71, 72 (associating
decadence with “self-indulgence and decline”). On the problem of individual and
collective self-indulgence and self-discipline, see generally DANIEL AKST, WE HAVE MET
THE ENEMY: SELF-CONTROL IN AN AGE OF EXCESS (2011), and BENJAMIN R. BARBER,
CON$UMED: HOW MARKETS CORRUPT CHILDREN, INFANTILIZE ADULTS, AND SWALLOW
CITIZENS WHOLE (2007). For discussion on the unstable combination of acquisitiveness
and hedonic consumption with prudence and deferred gratification, see DANIEL BELL,
THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 295 (20th anniversary ed. 1996).
114. These would include genuine and reasonable prudence or practical wisdom,
courage or fortitude, temperance or reasonable self-restraint, and justice as the sustained
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increasing role for collective “denial,” distraction, and self-delusion;115 a
cultural shift in the balance between the Freudian “pleasure principle”
and the “reality principle”116 or genuine maturation; an indifference to a
wide range of gross inefficiencies; the phenomenon of education as
increasingly a matter of credentialing as distinct from meaningful
learning,117 study effort,118 and basic equity and equality; limited attention
spans and unpromising vocabulary and literary trends;119 and finally and
disposition to give to any person what is due and proper. See generally, e.g., ARISTOTLE,
supra note 21; JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES (Richard Winston et al.
trans., Harcourt, Brace & World 1965) (1954).
115. For the problem of “denial” in the context of business perceptions and
decisionmaking, see generally RICHARD S. TEDLOW, DENIAL: WHY BUSINESS LEADERS
FAIL TO LOOK FACTS IN THE FACE—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2010).
116. See SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE (James Strachey ed. &
trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1989) (1920). For Freud on the so-called death instinct, see
SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 46–62 (James Strachey ed., Joan Riviere trans.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1990) (1923). One important question is whether the idea of
“thanatos,” or the death instinct, is scientifically superfluous or whether it is needed to
explain trends that are otherwise not fully explainable. See Phillip Longman,
Demography and Economic Destiny, B IG Q UESTIONS O NLINE (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.bigquestionsonline.com/columns/phillip-longman/demography-andeconomic-destiny.
117. See, e.g., RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROKSA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED
LEARNING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 30, 121–22 (2011) (“American higher education is
characterized by limited or no learning [if not declines] for a large proportion of
students, and persistent or growing inequalities over time.”); see also id. at 3 (“Many
students come to college not only poorly prepared by prior schooling . . . but . . . they
enter school with attitudes, norms, values, and behaviors that are often at odds with
academic commitment.”); id. at 120 (“[T]he college experience is perceived by many
students to be, at its core, a social experience. The collegiate culture emphasizes
sociability and encourages students to have fun . . . .”).
118. For empirical evidence of significantly diminished study time among college
students across the board with a number of arguably relevant factors controlled for, see
Philip Babcock & Mindy Marks, Leisure College, USA: The Decline in Student Study
Time, EDUC. OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Wash., D.C.), Aug.
2010, at 1, available at http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~babcock/LeisureCollege_4.pdf. See
also Philip Babcock, Real Costs of Nominal Grade Inflation? New Evidence from
Student Course Evaluations, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 983 (2010); Philip Babcock & Mindy
Marks, The Falling Time Cost of College: Evidence from Half a Century of Time Use
Data, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 468 (2011).
119. See, e.g., MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM: A WRITER’S MANIFESTO 209
(2009) (referring to the “atomization of attention spans” and “the degradation of
concentration”). More specifically, see NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE
INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 16, 194, 221 (2010). Carr describes the Internet as
“preventing [the] mind[] from thinking either deeply or creatively.” Id. at 119. “It’s not
only deep thinking that requires a calm, attentive mind. It’s also empathy and
compassion.” Id. at 220. See also Patricia Cohen, Internet Use Affects how We
Remember, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
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most generally, a vague sense of impending gravitational collapse120—
not merely of some particular currently dominant cultural assumptions
and standards but of many widely shared basic assumptions and progressive
aspirations.121 There may even be, at worst, a vague sense of resistance
among the public or political elites to genuine learning and genuine
responsibility, at least where such learning would upset strongly held
preferences and preconceptions.
Anyone is of course welcome to judge any or all of these tendencies to
not be characteristic of either lateness or our culture, to find them biased
or trivial, or to substitute additional trends for those listed. But a
reasonable case could be made, along the lines classically suggested by
Thomas Mann,122 that at least some of these cultural trends could be
reflected in judicial decisionmaking.
One specific way to link broader cultural trends to judicial decisions,
in accordance with Mann, would be to assume that some such trends
might be subconsciously “absorbed” into judges’ understanding of the
popular worldview or their intuitive “common sense.” More specifically,
the above cultural trends might provide much of the defining “frame,”123
or what are called the decisional “anchors”124 for adjudication, including

2011/07/15/health/15memory.html?_r=1&r=1 (describing studies that suggest using search
engines and online databases affect the way people remember information). For
discussion on some trends in adult voluntary reading, see HELPRIN, supra, at 208.
Helprin states that there is a substantial decline in adult voluntary reading over time. Id.
Again, a case could be made for linking such trends to forms of barbarism as well as to
lateness or decline. More optimistically, see the study NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE
ARTS, READING ON THE RISE: A NEW CHAPTER IN AMERICAN LITERACY 1–2 (2009),
available at http://www.nea.gov/research/ReadingonRise.pdf. But see Wendy Griswold
et al., Reading and the Reading Class in the Twenty-First Century, 31 ANN. REV. SOC.
127, 127 (2005) (“[A] reading class is emerging, restricted in size but disproportionate in
influence . . . .”). For an expression of concern over shrinking, as opposed to evolving or
adapting, vocabularies, see Editorial, Lost: 15,000 Words―When Language Shrinks,
Ideas Are Next To Go, Then Capacity To Uplift Humanity, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Feb. 21, 2005, at 06B, available at 2005 WLNR 28109385.
120. See EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 619–30
(Dero A. Saunders ed., Penguin Books abr. ed. 1985) (1788) (describing Rome as
eventually naturally collapsing of its own weight and accumulated civic vices). Gibbon
is responding in part to SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 62–63 (Image Books 1958) (c.
426 A.D.).
121. The idea of lateness is thus not the trivial observation that cultural institutions
are evolving in ways that some currently favored groups may not see as in their interest.
122. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
123. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions
and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) (discussing frames as psychological
principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of options).
124. See HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120–
66 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
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constitutional judgments as to what in our culture is realistic, risky, or
unlikely.
Overall, the category of barbarism doubtless has less to plausibly offer
our inquiry than does that of lateness or decline. One could, however,
argue that some of the considerations mentioned above, including some
trends in acceptance of some forms of violence and in literacy, vocabulary,
attention spans, et cetera, could be easily classed as indicators not of
lateness but of a mild form of barbarism. To the extent that one views
our politics, for example, as increasingly fragmented and uncivil
by some—but not all—recent standards or as increasingly Hobbesian,125
one could characterize those trends as more mildly barbaric than decadent.
“Insensitivity” is a quality that may sometimes bridge the mildly
barbaric and the late or decadent. Theodor Adorno once declared that
“[t]o write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.”126 One, if jaded and
cynical, could argue for the decadence of insensitivity as well. We
might think of the microsociety of William Golding’s Lord of the
Flies 127 as descending from civilization to barbarism as opposed to
decadence. But we find remarkable insensitivity and indifference to
even one’s fellows in the decadent society of the Eloi in H.G. Wells’s
The Time Machine.128 A number of the phenomena to which the cultural
critic Mark Helprin points in his book Digital Barbarism might also be
thought of as characteristically late.129 These overlaps may be real,
especially if the idea of the mildly barbaric has evolved over time.130

125. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183–88 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin
Books 1985) (1651). For constructive responses, see, for example, DAVID P. GAUTHIER,
THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN (1969); JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
TRADITION (1986); and GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
(1986). Again, conflicts may involve not only current cohorts but one generation’s
increasing indifference to the well-being of generations to follow.
126. THEODOR W. ADORNO, Cultural Criticism and Society, in PRISMS 17, 34
(Samuel Weber & Shierry Weber trans., 1997) (1967).
127. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (Perigee Books 2003) (1954).
128. See generally H.G. WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (1898), available at http://
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/35/pg35.html. Note the rather complex relationship over
time between the decadent Eloi and the largely barbaric, if somewhat more technically
competent, Morlocks.
129. See HELPRIN, supra note 119, at 193, 195, 208–09.
130. Edward Gibbon may, in the eighteenth century, have associated the term
barbarism with not only assumed crudity of mind but also groups that might otherwise
be considered civilized, but corrupted. See 4 J.G.A. POCOCK, BARBARISM AND RELIGION:
BARBARIANS, SAVAGES AND EMPIRES 11, 15 (2008 ed.) (2005). Compare the recent idea
of “gentle barbarism” as developed in Jean-Pierre Le Goff, Modernization and Gentle
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With this unavoidably untidy sense of some of the qualities of a late
culture,131 we can now return to Justice Scalia’s approach in Brown. We
can now consider the latter in light of the former, as Thomas Mann and
others have suggested is generally reasonable.132 Based on our reflections
on Justice Scalia’s approach to Brown from a broader cultural perspective,
we emphasize again the price to be paid if we endorse what we might
call Justice Scalia’s “jurisprudential equivalence” approach to political
speech and entertainment speech in Brown.133
IV. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL SPEECH AND ENTERTAINMENT SPEECH
AND THE COSTS OF HOLDING THEM TO BE REALISTICALLY
INDISTINGUISHABLE
We can now reconsider the overall credibility of Justice Scalia’s
approach in Brown in its broader legal and cultural context. To reiterate
the essence of Justice Scalia’s approach in Brown:
[V]ideo games qualify for First Amendment protection. The Free Speech
Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have
long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment,
and dangerous to try. “Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda

Barbarism, 49 DIOGENES 41, 41 (2002). For a broader perspective, see S.N. Eisenstadt,
Barbarism and Modernity, 33 SOCIETY 31, 31 (1996).
131. For some further provocative, if not invariably convincing, approaches to
cultural lateness, long-term decline, or sheer decadence, see, for example, CHARLES
BERNHEIMER, DECADENT SUBJECTS 21 (T. Jefferson Kline & Naomi Schor eds., 2002).
Bernheimer writes, “[O]f one thing Nietzsche remains sure: decadence is a disease that
must be resisted for the sake of health and ascending vitality.” Id.; see also THE
DEDALUS BOOK OF DECADENCE (MORAL RUINS) 8 (Brian Stableford ed., 1990) (1900)
(referring to “a languid hedonism which is contemptuous of arbitrary and tyrannical rules
of conduct and scornful of all higher aspirations”); id. at 7 (referring to “the aesthetics of
cultural free-fall”); id. at 65 (referring to “a sense of hopelessness; a haunting suspicion
that all that was left for men to do was fiddle while Rome burned”); ANTHONY O’HEAR,
AFTER PROGRESS: FINDING THE WAY FORWARD 153 (1999) (noting that in Oswald
Spengler’s theory, “the unifying vision is lost”); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 63 (1984)
(“Special-interest groups . . . slow growth by reducing the rate at which resources are
reallocated from one activity or industry to another in response to new technologies or
conditions.”); F.C. White, On Properties and Decadence in Society, 87 ETHICS 352, 357
(1977) (stating that the decadent society “has ‘gone to seed’ or is ‘run down’; . . . it has
lost its drive, ambition, self-discipline, and organization”). But cf. id. at 361 (noting,
militarily, though that “[m]any decadent societies have been only too willing to defend
[and conquer] . . . with consummate energy and conviction”); Jane Duran, On Decadence, 65
PHILOSOPHY 455 (1990) (focusing mainly on artistic decadence). Note that most
accounts of lateness seem compatible with continual policy tinkering and policy initiatives,
however predictably ineffectual.
132. See supra notes 26, 104 and accompanying text.
133. See infra Part IV.
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through fiction.
doctrine.”134

What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s

In what respects, then, might Justice Scalia’s judgment here indirectly
and subconsciously reflect the much broader late spirit of the age? We
should, for the sake of fairness, continue to bear in mind that to think of
any cultural phenomenon as late is not to thereby prove its defectiveness.
As Herbert Marcuse observed years ago, what is denounced as “decay”
may actually be liberating and genuinely progressive.135
Nor should we imagine that all persons, including all federal judges,
are equally affected by the lateness of the culture, let alone by all late
phenomena. Socrates, for example, held that in a late, decaying democracy,
“the old, anxious not to be thought disagreeable tyrants, imitate the
young and condescend to enter into their jokes and amusements.”136 As
much as a Supreme Court Justice might wish to avoid being unfairly
thought a disagreeable tyrant, there may be a narrower limit on the
inclination of the Justices to actually enter into the amusements of the
young, as distinct from constitutionally validating such amusements.137
But the decision to strongly constitutionally protect a phenomenon,
including violent video games, may in some cases operate to culturally
validate the phenomenon in question.
Once the Court leaves the free speech area of classical political
argumentation and focuses instead more hazily on vague, nonparticularized
“expression,” the drawing of First Amendment categorical distinctions
may often seem subjective, if not arbitrary. As Daniel Bell once suggested,
“[T]he very waywardness of language introduces a larger degree of
uncertainty in our . . . theories of knowing. And given this centrality of
language as the frame of understanding, for some writers, ‘anything
goes.’”138
134. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (emphasis
added) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). But again, note the
available alternative model suggested infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
135. See HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY
OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 60 (2d ed. 1991) (1964) (“[T]he term ‘decadent’ far
more often denounces the genuinely progressive traits of a dying culture than the real
factors of decay.”). For discussion of Marcuse on decadence, see Henry Winthrop,
Variety of Meaning in the Concept of Decadence, 31 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
510, 513 (1971) (stating that Marcuse refers to “the feeling that one is living through the
dissolution of a civilization—but does not know what to do about it”).
136. PLATO, supra note 22, at pt. IV, bks. VIII–IX, at 285–96.
137. See id.
138. BELL, supra note 113, at 297.
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This uncertainty, especially if it has been increasing in our culture,
might not inspire judicial confidence even in traditional verbal distinctions,
as between political and entertainment speech. But even without this
assumed uneasiness regarding the stability of language, consider how
just a few of the possible symptoms of cultural lateness might tend to
affect the judicial analysis of entertainment speech and political speech,
not merely in the context of violent video games but much more broadly.
Consider, for example, any effect, even indirect and subconscious, of
the late cultural phenomenon of a “loss of nerve” or an unnatural selfconsciousness instead of taken-for-granted self-assurance in the judicial
wire-walkers of our day.139 If a judge begins, even subconsciously, with
that sense of the culture’s uncertainty and uneasiness, consider how an
attempt to distinguish politics from entertainment might well seem
unrealistic and daunting. Add in, then, a vague sense of cultural
fragmentation140 and perhaps a sense of the relativism, subjectivism, and
similar tendencies at work throughout the culture.141 To those phenomena,
add in as well any unavoidable effects of a broad cultural entertainment
coarsening, any reduced public confidence in any official claim to
genuinely legitimate and fully justified legal or political authority, and
the widespread cultural sense that leisure time is largely about consumption
of entertaining experiences of whatever quality and is to be generally
indulged.142 And finally, in vaguely Freudian terms, add in the sense,
consciously recognized or not, that the broader culture, particularly in
the private sphere, has been gradually resetting the balance between the
pleasure principle and the reality principle in favor of the former.143
None of these cultural influences need affect one’s approach to
politics and entertainment and their respective value as speech at a
conscious level. The above trends, if they are indeed real, may be at this
point rather like the unseen air we breathe. We may see their influence
only in the form of what we take to be common sense or what is realistic,
mainstream, familiar, practical, or dangerous.144 But declining to try to
reasonably distinguish, where appropriate, between political and
entertainment speech—particularly when that reluctance leads to rigorous,

139. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. As well, any generally diminished
interest in the four classic secular virtues, see supra note 114 and accompanying text,
might also tend to blur any qualitative distinction between speech on justice-related or
prudential political matters and speech oriented toward entertainment.
144. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
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demanding strict scrutiny protection for entertainment speech145—
nevertheless eventually involves, as we have suggested, substantial,
potentially widespread, and gradually increasing costs.
We need not go so far as to claim, as did the noted cultural critic Neil
Postman, that our politics has largely decayed into a form of
entertainment.146 Postman more broadly argued that “[w]hen a population
becomes distracted by trivia, when cultural life is redefined as a perpetual
round of entertainments, when serious public conversation becomes a
form of baby-talk . . . and their public business a vaudeville act, then a
nation finds itself at risk; culture-death is a clear possibility.”147 Or
alternatively: “Our politics, religion, news, athletics, education
and commerce have been transformed into congenial adjuncts of show
business, largely without protest or even much popular notice. The
result is that we are a people on the verge of amusing ourselves to
death.”148
We certainly need not take the argument anywhere near so far. For
one thing, the chronic shrillness, demagoguery, animosity, implacability,
and increasing polarization of contemporary politics, despite the large
stakes, 149 do not feel reducible, for most persons, to any form of
entertainment or amusement, even to that of a soccer rivalry or a
professional wrestling event. Anyone who senses that his or her ox may
be in line for even minimal goring is unlikely to think of politics as mere
entertainment.150
As we have suggested above, though, mere amusement or
entertainment speech cannot be merged into the category of political
speech as the established case law has typically used the term.151 If there
is nevertheless some other sense in which entertainment speech merges
indistinguishably into political speech, by a relativist, late cultural logic,
it will inevitably be impossible to long retain meaningful distinctions in

145. See cases cited supra Part II; see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S.
Ct. 2729, 2733–42 (2011).
146. See NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE
AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS (20th anniversary ed. 2005) (1985).
147. Id. at 155–56.
148. Id. at 3–4.
149. See Wright, supra note 110.
150. More specifically, austerity or budget-battle protests are rarely mere
entertainments even to those least directly affected, even if the official rhetoric and
public protest tactics involve attention-attracting elements of entertainment.
151. See supra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
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constitutional protection between political speech and commercial speech,
sexual harassment speech, or even any obscenity that is realistically
objected to largely as offensive on the basis of its viewpoint.152
In particular, applying a rigorous strict scrutiny test to content-based
regulations of not just political speech but also most commercial speech,
sexual harassment speech, and various forms of obscene materials153
would not amount to a clear expansion of liberty or an upgrade of a
genuinely progressive society. Broadly expanding the use of strict scrutiny
in various speech areas would often tend, as the above examples suggest,
to reinforce the interests of already culturally dominant groups. It is far
from clear why we should be willing to make greater sacrifices on behalf
of enhanced free speech protection for commercial marketing, verbal
sexual harassment, or various forms of obscenity if there is really no
reason for strict scrutiny, including a rigorous causation requirement, in
order to regulate such categories of speech on the basis of content.
And once we tire of overprotecting such categories of speech, at
substantial costs in various other substantial values, we would then face
an awkward choice. We could choose to water down the protection we
give to content-based restrictions on political speech, along with the
other forms of supposedly indistinguishable speech noted above. Or
else, contrary to Justice Scalia’s154 approach in Brown, we could instead
decide that after all, reasonably distinguishing between political speech
and entertainment speech, in most contexts, is often neither as demanding
nor as dangerous as Justice Scalia imagines.
In fact, we do have case precedent for the Supreme Court’s quiet
reconsideration of an earlier judgment that a similar speech category
distinction was too difficult or dangerous to make. The Court, at one
point in time, was unwilling to distinguish, in libel cases, between speech on
matters of public interest or concern and speech on matters of merely
private interest or concern.155 But some years later, Justice Lewis Powell,
the author of the prior opinion, adopted the position that just such a
distinction could properly be drawn.156 In that context, the Court’s
152. See supra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
153. See in particular Judge Posner’s discussion in American Amusement Machine
Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574–75 (7th Cir. 2001).
154. Although we have referred herein to the approach in question as that of Justice
Scalia, it bears noting that his majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2732 (2011).
155. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). When referring to
drawing the speech category distinction in question, Justice Powell, for the Court, stated,
“We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges.” Id.
156. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757–60
(1985) (endorsing and applying such a distinction between speech on matters of public or
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unwillingness to draw an important distinction between speech categories
was reversible. Whether Justice Scalia’s course in Brown is similarly
reversible is largely a matter of contemporary, broader cultural trends.

private concern); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos 547 U.S. 410, 417–19 (2006) (employing the
same distinction in the public employee speech context). For further discussion, see R.
George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV.
27 (1988).
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